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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the performance of two cases of renewable energy (RE) auction/tender
systems in an effort to contribute to the evaluation of and best practice in RE auction/tender
systems. This is done by comparing regimes in different settings, one concerned with Danish
offshore wind development, the other concerned with renewable energy development in South
Africa (SA). It is found that regulatory factors which promote certainty in deployment, including
measures to ensure that projects achieve grid connection, are important in assuring delivery of the
programmes. However cost reductions that are associated with renewable energy auctions are not
caused  by the auction systems themselves, but rather are associated with general declines in the
costs of renewable energy technologies. Moreover, the effect of renewable energy auctions
systems may be more concerned with limiting renewable energy deployment rather than reducing
the costs of energy generated by renewable energy projects that are deployed.
1. Introduction
Competitive procurement of renewable energy through
auctions and tenders is a relatively new way of procuring
renewable energy (RE). Renewable energy auctions and
feed-in tariffs are both associated with the award of long
term contracts to renewable energy developers which
guarantee payment of specific amounts for energy which
is generated. The distinction between an auction and a
tender is that in the latter format factors other than pure
price are taken into account by the Government in
awarding the contract. As will be discussed, both
systems studied here (in Denmark and South Africa)
have elements of auctions and tenders. 
This paper aims to contribute to the evaluation of RE
auction/tender systems. This will be done through
analysis of the performance of two auction/tenders
systems with regard to some key selected criteria. These
criteria are grouped around the two crucial concepts of
certainty and cost. 
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In doing so, we can develop theory and practice of the
effective use of auctions/tenders. This paper could
provide useful information for policymakers when
designing future auction/tender systems.
Interest in, and reliance on such competitive procurement
methods is expanding. Indeed EU state aid guidelines for
renewable energy support now recommend the use of such
methods [1]. According to EU Commission advice:
‘A well-designed auction can lead to significant
competition between bids revealing the real costs of the
individual projects, promoters and technologies, thus
leading to cost-efficient support levels, and limiting the
support needed to the minimum’ [2].  On the other hand
supporters of setting ‘feed-in tariff’ prices by
administrative means argue that the effect of the EU
Commission guidelines ‘is to contain renewable power
growth to lower levels than so far, and to give big
corporate operators a better position to compete in this
sector’ [3]. 
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So far there is a relative scarcity of work analysing
the effectiveness of renewable energy auction schemes,
mainly owing to the fact that they have not been in
operation very much or very long compared to
conventional feed-in tariffs or green certificate support
mechanisms for renewable energy. However there is an
extensive literature on renewable energy policy
instruments in general, a few of which can be mentioned
on account of their numbers of citations and/or
relevance [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], and several others which
can be cited as an example of a wider literature [43],
[44], [45]. [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [53].
A review of the existing (limited) literature on
renewable energy auctions suggests that among the
aspects of design studied, the issue of the nature and
type of penalties imposed for non-delivery of projects
is important [4].  Anaya and Pollitt [5] comment that
the absence of penalties was a factor in the failure of
the British renewable energy procurement mechanism
to deliver capacity in the 1990s [6]. Moore [6] has
compared the UK experience to that of Brazil, which
has organised its RE programme through auctions.
More broadly, a review of administrative rules
underpinning design of RE auctions has been
undertaken by IRENA  [7].
A discussion of key issues in implementation of
renewable energy auctions may be gained from detailed
examination of particular cases. In particular we need to
examine the extent to which, and the costs at which, the
projects are actually being delivered and also the ways
in which delivery success is facilitated or challenged
through regulatory conditions. Regulatory conditions
are studied by reference to the concept of ‘certainty’.
In particular there will be: 
1. A discussion of the extent to which the
delivery of renewable energy projects is
associated with the degree of regulatory
certainty, this including not just with the
auction/tender bidding mechanism, but also
with related infrastructural issues. Details of
criteria to measure this certainty will be set out
in the Methods section. The criteria for
certainty includes modes of scrutiny of bids for
projects, coordination of delivery of projects,
achieving planning consent, site evaluation,
ensuring grid connection and ensuring the
developers take some financial responsibility
for the possibility of failure to deliver the
projects. 
2. A discussion about the extent to which the
introduction of auction systems in renewable
energy can be cited as a cause of cost reductions
in the delivery of RE projects. The key criterion
here is whether the changes in costs can be
clearly associated with the auction/tender
mechanisms themselves or can be associated
with contextual market or technological
changes. 
The next step in the paper will be to describe the
method adopted. This will be followed by an analysis of
the Danish programme of offshore windfarms followed
by an analysis of the South African renewable energy
programme. The results will then be discussed and
finally conclusions will be made.
2. Method
Certainty is measured  by examining the following
issues:
a) Planning consent for the projects. The degree to
which planning consent is guaranteed for the
projects or at least that the developers have
secured planning consent as a condition for
being awarded a contract.
b) The extent to which grid connection is assured  
c) The extent to which the government helps the
projects to determine project viability at the sites
chosen (e.g. assessing windspeeds)
d) The degree of coordination between agencies to
ensure delivery of the projects given contracts
e) The extent to which developers have to pay
significant  financial penalties if they fail to
deliver the project on time
f) Scrutinisation and evaluation of financial
viability of bids for contracts
Cost is examined by studying changes in prices
awarded to renewable energy developers in successive
rounds of contract awards. Contextual issues are also
examined, especially wider changes in technology costs
that are independent of types of policy instrument used
to promote renewable energy projects.
The technique employed here is to analyse country
case studies of renewable energy auction regimes. We
select two of them as apparently successful (so far)
exercises in renewable energy auctions. These are
Denmark offshore wind power auctions/tenders and
South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power
Producers Programme (REIPPP). These two cases are
selected  because their renewable energy policy
instruments involve RE auctions/tenders in different
conditions. One is  what is known as a developed
industrial economy, another in an emerging economy. It
may be the case that if there are common lessons to be
learned from these cases in different economic
conditions, then such common lessons may be plausibly
used as guides to form hypotheses with which to study
other cases of RE auctions. This study is compiled
mainly by reference to other studies, official reports and
reports by NGOs and also a small number of interviews
that have been organised in order to shed light on issues
that were not so otherwise clear in the documents
studied.
3. Danish Offshore Wind Auctions/Tenders
We shall structure this section by examining some
relevant history and background of the Danish
renewable energy and particularly offshore wind
sector before describing the evolution of the
tender/auction system. Then we shall look at the
extent to which the regulatory conditions for offshore
wind contribute to ‘certainty’ factors that help
deployment, and then there will be an examination of
the impact of auctions on costs of offshore wind. This
section on Denmark will be rounded off by a
discussion of how outcomes have been affected by the
certainty in the regulatory arrangements and how costs
have been affected by the auction system.
3.1. History and background of Danish offshore wind
Denmark’s offshore wind capacity is mainly bound up
in five farms constructed since 2001, with a contract for
another windfarm  (Horns Rev 3)having been awarded
in March 2015. Wind Power generated around 40 per
cent of the level of Danish electricity demand in 2014,
and this proportion continues to increase [8].
Calculations made on the basis of data available from
the Danish Energy Agency suggests that offshore wind
now makes up around half of the production from
Danish wind power.  Denmark plans to continue
expanding offshore wind as a major component of its
target to generate 50 per cent of electricity from
renewable by 2020 [9].
Denmark was a pioneer in wind turbine development
in the 1970s to 1990s[10].  It also developed a system of
funding RE that became known as ‘feed-in tariff’, that of
setting prices that electricity utilities would have to pay
to producers of wind power and other RE sources.
During the 1990s Denmark also acted as a pioneer by
extending its wind power programme into offshore
projects. However, a new more right wing  Government
took office at the end of 2001 and they introduced
policies which  led to a slowdown in the rate of onshore
wind power development. The focus for RE
development was largely shifted thereafter onto offshore
wind projects. A consensus has developed about this
programme, with legislation agreed in 2012 that saw
further emphasis on the offshore wind programme, with
some continued development of onshore windfarms.
The onshore programme has continued to be funded
through a traditional ‘feed-in’ tariff style of approach,
whilst the offshore programme has been funded through
a renewable energy auction scheme since 2005.
Initially Denmark used a form of ‘feed-in tariff’
method to fund its first offshore windfarms,  involving
paying a ‘minimum price’ for a limited period. In this
case the payments were set to be buttressed by extra
payments if the wholesale market price rose fell below a
set amount, although in 2001 when this arrangement
was established power prices were very low and did not
begin to rise until 2004. Horns Rev 1 and Rødsand 1
windfarms were constructed on this basis. However,
after 2002 the Government changed the procurement
policy to adopt an auction system for offshore
windfarms [11]. This system has been used since then,
albeit with some fine-tuning as is discussed in the next
sections.
At the time of writing this paper, a tender was being
organised for a ‘nearshore’ 350 MW windfarm. Five
companies applied for the project, and three of them
have been invited to negotiate with the DEA to be given
the tender  [15].  20 per cent of the equity in this
windfarm will be offered to local people.
3.2. Evolution of the auction system
The system has gone through some changes since the
start of the auction programme in order to improve
project delivery. In particular penalties have been
introduced. 
The launch of the auction programme preceded an
increase in energy prices, which became marked from
2005 onwards. This coincided with an increase in
commodity prices of resources such as steel and copper
that are used in construction of offshore windfarms.
Hence offshore windfarm costs also increased.
Although one offshore windfarm (Horns Rev 2) was
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completed under the original tender price that emerged
from the auction, the original developers of the other
windfarm given a contract at the auction round
(Rødsand 2) withdrew after it became clear to them that
the price agreed was no longer profitable.  A new
auction was organised and one company bid for the
contract at a rather higher price. However, this time the
contract stipulated that a failure to complete the
contract within a defined time period would entail a
penalty being paid. Penalty clauses have been inserted
in the contracts since then.
Although the general principles have remained the
same the system was fine-tuned between the last two
auctions. Only one bid was made for Anholt windfarm
in 2010, and so the system was reformed. The details of
the delivery schedule and penalty mechanism were left
up to negotiations between the Danish Energy Agency
(Energistyrelsen) and the developers who had been
approved as bidders in the pre-qualification stage. Four
bids were made for the following Horns Rev 3 windfarm
in 2015. In effect the process became a little more like a
tender rather than an auction. 
The premium price is payable for 20 TWh of
production, which is likely to correspond to around 12
years of operation, after which market rates for electricity
prices will be paid to the operators [14]. All of Danish
offshore contracts have been won by large multinational
companies such as DONG, Vattenfall and E.ON.
A penalty, rising  up to 300 million DKK, was set to
be paid by the developer if the winning company (in
this case Vattenfall) failed to complete the 400 MW
Horns Rev 3 project by a timetable set out in the
agreement  [13]. No accounts of the capital cost of
Horns Rev 3 are currently available, but if we assume
a capital cost for the project of 30 million DKK per
MW then this maximum penalty is equivalent to a
penalty of around 2.5 per cent of the capital costs of the
project. 
3.3. Factors contributing to certainty in Danish
offshore wind
Using the set of criteria set out in the methods, we can
summarise the Danish offshore wind tender system the
following way. The system adopted is highly regulated
and focussed containing the following elements which
promote greater certainty [9, 12]:
a) Planning consent is guaranteed for the project to
be procured based on a planning consensus
among stakeholders
b) Grid connection costs up to the windfarm,
including the necessary transformer, are born by
the electricity system rather than the windfarm
developer
c) Initial surveys of windspeeds and wave patterns
and also geotechnical and environmental studies
of the seabed are carried out under the auspices
of the Government 
d) In general the project is closely coordinated
between the Danish Energy Agency (representing
the Danish Government) and the developers
e) Developers have to pay significant financial
penalties if they fail to deliver the project on time
f) There is scrutiny and evaluation of financial
viability of bids for contracts. The Danish
Energy Agency operates a ‘pre-qualification’
process to ensure that the companies making
bids will have project proposals that are
economically viable
3.4. The issue of technology costs under the auction
system 
The paper now turns to look at the issue of what
changes in technology costs there have been under the
auction programme, as measured in power prices
awarded to the developers with successful bids. Figure
1 shows the prices awarded for power purchase
agreements for offshore windfarms expressed in 2015
Danish prices. Note that this refers only to projects
that have been completed and the most recent project,
Horns Rev 3, which is expected to be completed. 
As can be seen from Figure 1 the bid prices for
projects increased from 2001 onwards, and only the
latest project settled this year has shown that prices have
fallen again. The operators of Horns Rev 3 will be paid
770 DKK per MWh, which converts to $116 (USD) per
MWh, 100 euros per MWh or £70 (GBP) per MWh.
However, it needs to be borne in mind that this price
excludes grid connection, which could add around 20
per cent to the price if the developer had to pay. 
Nevertheless, this cost compares favourably with the
cost of offshore windfarm contracts awarded by the UK
(also through an auction system) at £120 per MWh. The
fact that the UK schemes tend to be in deeper waters
compared to Horns Rev 3 might also account for some
of the difference in cost. The UK system of auctions for
‘contracts for difference’, which announced its first
contract awards in 2015, is perhaps too new to be the
subject of analysis of outcomes.
46 International journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 08 2015
Renewable Energy Auctions and Tenders: How good are they?
copper and other energy and commodities prices. By the
same token it should not be automatically assumed that
the more recent decline in offshore wind costs is solely
attributable to the tender system for awarding offshore
wind contracts.
We can help explain price fluctuations by comparing
the price changes with studies of contracts that have not
been awarded using auction methods. Such a
comparison may be used as a proxy for a comparison of
wind power technology costs. It may be plausible to
look at studies of how wind turbine prices have
fluctuated elsewhere on the global market, as reflected
through prices that have to be paid to developers for
electricity that is generated. One time-series study
related to the US market for wind power can be seen in
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Figure 1: Prices set for offshore windfarms in Denmark
Source:  [17], [18],  [19],  [20]. All prices converted to 2015
Danish prices using [52]. 
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Figure 2: Onshore wind power contract prices in the USA - Reprinted with permission of the authors. Source [21, p 60]
It is interesting that the prices payable under the old
feed-in tariff regime (Denmark 2005) are significantly
lower than any awarded under the auction regime. These
are not exactly comparable given that under the feed-in
tariff regime developers had the possibilities of making
more money over the minimum price if market
electricity prices rose. However, at the time that the
projects were developed energy prices were still low and
developers would have had to finance the project at the
minimum price. However, it should not be concluded
from this that feed-in tariffs are necessarily more cost-
effective compared to auctions. Rather we could
examine contextual factors for explanations of cost
changes, in particular changing levels of energy, steel,
Figure 2. The ‘PPAs’ that are studied are ‘power
purchase agreements’, which are payments per MWh to
the developers, and as such are analogous to the
payments made per MWh to Danish offshore windfarm
developers under contracts issued under the auction
programme. Although this study refers to onshore wind
turbines, offshore wind turbines were still largely based
on onshore technology during this period, and would
certainly have been sensitive to similar changes in
global wind turbine manufacturing costs.
From this it can be seen that there were big increases
in wind power prices from 2004 to 2009 followed by
decline in the most recent years. This is in parallel to the
increases in prices of Danish offshore wind power
Note: The US wind prices seem very low because the wind power contract prices are also, in effect, topped up by $23 per MWh 
(2013 prices) from the Federal Production Tax Credit.
contracts seen in Figure 1. Hence it can be plausibly
argued that technological factors would seem, from this
comparison, to be the main driver of fluctuations in
wind power costs rather than the procurement procedure
that is used by governments. It should be noted that in
the USA renewable portfolio standards which encourage
suppliers to offer contracts to renewable energy
operators are the standard means of allocating contracts
to wind developers  [16].  This is as opposed to auctions. 
3.5. Discussion
What does seem plausible is that the success of the
Danish offshore wind programme in delivering several
offshore windfarms through its auction/tender process is
much concerned with the degree of regulatory certainty
given to the developers and the degree of coordination
(organised through the Danish Energy Agency) that is
deployed to achieve this. This includes certainty about
grid connection, planning consent, technical site
investigations as well as payment of premium electricity
prices. The fact that the Danish Government switched
from having no penalties for non-implementation of
tenders towards having financial penalties for non-
delivery, after the Rodstand 2 project was not
implemented by its original contractors, suggests that a
penalty system for non-implementation may be useful,
in encouraging project delivery. 
As a general evaluation it can be said that the Danish
offshore wind programme seems to be successful in
that large volumes (relative to the size of Danish
electricity market) have been delivered. This can be
ascribed largely to the great degree of regulatory
certainty and coordination exercised by the Danish
Energy Agency. The prices are low relative to offshore
wind power, although the recent decline in contract
prices should be seen as redeeming sharp increases in
price from 2005 to 2010. The rise and fall of these prices
run in parallel to changes recorded in windfarm prices in
the USA.
4. South Africa (SA) and Renewables
We shall order the section on South Africa in a way that
is broadly similar to that which has been done in the case
of Danish offshore wind. We shall examine some
relevant history and background of the  South African
renewable energy programme, then we shall look at the
evolution of the South African tender/auction system for
renewable energy. We shall summarise the ways in
which certainty for the programme is to be achieved, and
then there will be an examination of the impact of
auctions on costs of renewable energy. This section on
South Africa will be rounded off by a discussion of how
outcomes have been affected by the certainty in the
regulatory arrangements and how costs have been
affected by the auction system.
4.1. History and background
South Africa’s RE programme is, as in most emerging
economies, a new one, but it is fast developing. Total
electricity generation capacity is around 45.7 GWe and
electricity consumption is around 234 TWh [40]. Hitherto
most electricity (over 90 per cent) has come from coal-
fired power stations run by the state owned electricity
utility, Eskom. An Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) which
was adopted in 2011 anticipates a rapid deployment of
RE, visualised as growing to over 20 GWe by 2030 [22].
South Africa’s electricity system has succeeded in
connecting up most of the country’s residents, and it has
done so whilst attempting to keep consumer prices as
low as possible. However, perhaps because of efforts by
the Government to restrict price rises, Eskom did not
build sufficient power station capacity to meet demand
for electricity. Since 2008 South Africa has suffered a
series of debilitating grid failures. Parallel to this there
has been increasing pressure for renewable energy
sources to be developed. 
An Integrated Resource Plan (IRP)which  was
adopted in 2011 anticipated a rapid deployment of RE,
visualised as growing to over 20 GWe by 2030 [22,
p 14–16]. The granting of over a 1000 MWe of
contracts a year since 2011 through a renewable energy
tender systems implies that, up to date, this ambition is
on track. By Round 4 in April 2015, 5037MWe of
renewable energy contracts had been issued  [23].  Of
this capacity just over half has gone to onshore wind
and nearly 40 per cent to solar photo voltaics (PV),
other contracts also going to concentrated solar power,
biomass, small hydro and biogas.
4.2. Evolution of the auction/tender system
The South African Government’s Renewable Energy
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme
was launched in 2011 in order to provide the main
means of meeting the IRP target for renewable energy
deployment.
Initial suggestions were made in favour of a feed-in
tariff made before 2011  [24]  [25].  However in the end
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no feed-in tariff offer was made. Pressure from energy-
intensive  industry and government departments such as
the Treasury for prices to be kept as low as possible was
associated with the adoption of a tender system. 
The biggest contribution that will come from
introducing independent power producers (IPP’s) is that
it will create a more efficient industry because at the
moment with Eskom’s monopoly there is virtually no
incentive for them to be efficient.  Also efficiency
requires transparency which competition naturally
introduces. [26].
The Department of Energy DOE receives tenders for
contracts to fill up annual tranches of renewable energy
procurement. Successful proposals not only have to bid
low prices, but they also have to fulfil criteria for local
economic development as part of the country’s black
economic empowerment (BEE) programme. The BEE
criteria constitute 30 per cent of the criteria for awarding
the contracts. 
Contribution to local economic development and
black economic empowerment are key criteria in the
selection of winning bids, involving criteria such as the
need to achieve at least 2.5 per cent of equity ownership
by local people and ‘Between 12% and 20% of the
people employed on each project have to be residents of
local communities located within 50km of the project
site’ [42]. The local and black economic empowerment
criteria make up 25 per cent of the scoring in evaluation
of the bids [33]. It may be that such requirements have,
paradoxically, favoured non-South African developers
associated with large multinational companies secure
large proportions of the project given contracts. ENEL,
for example, the former Italian state electricity company
has picked up a considerable portion of the contracted
capacity [40]. 
The equity and bank loans necessary to expedite the
projects can be sourced at much lower rates of interest
by multinational companies (who can issue guarantees
based on their balance sheets) compared to most
domestic (South African) developers [28], [51]. This
has contributed both to low bid prices for the RE
projects but also a trend towards ownership of the
projects given contracts by non-South African interests. 
It is necessary to explain how the coordination  of the
renewable energy programme is to be achieved. This
also involves explanation of the grid connection
arrangements and the penalty system. Hence we have
three elements of the coordination system that provides
to the ‘certainty’. 
First, there is a penalty system to ensure that those
who win and then accept contracts are committed to
project delivery. Prospective developers have to lodge a
bid bond with the authorities organising the tender
system (the Department of Energy) of 100,000 ZAR per
MW. Which is roughly 1 per cent of capital costs of the
project. Bonds are returned if the companies making
tenders are unsuccessful. If the developers win a
contract and then sign with the Government they must
then deposit a further 100,00 ZAR per MW. 
Second, there is a coordinating group of agencies to
steer the REIPPP. This involves the Department of
Energy, Eskom, which has a near-monopoly of the
electricity industry, the National Energy Regulator of
South Africa, and the Treasury.
Third, there has been a commitment within the
programme that Eskom will ensure cheap connection of
the renewable energy projects into the electricity grid.
This is very important to the programme, especially as the
prices for the projects have fallen in successive rounds. 
In practice Eskom has had difficulty in redeeming its
commitment to connect to the grid all of the RE projects
winning bids. In some cases grid connection proved to
be rather more expensive for the projects than originally
envisaged by the RE developers.  Initially the early
projects (Rounds 1 and 2), seemed able to absorb higher
than anticipated grid connection costs into their cost
structure [29]. However in the case of Round 3 problems
emerged which led to the postponement of the financial
closure of the round from autumn of 2014 to Spring of
2015. These delays were put down to the financial
problems suffered by Eskom in offering affordable grid
connection to the RE projects [34, 35].  This problem
was only overcome when the coordinating group of
agencies procured more finance for Eskom based on a
loan from a German bank [37]. 
Despite the hiccup with the postponement of
financial closure for Round 4 projects there is
confidence that all but 2 of the 64 successful bids made
in Rounds 1–3 are going ahead. Two of the 17 projects
given contracts in Round 3 did not go through to
financial closure, implying that the developers would
forfeit their bid bonds. However there are still question
marks about the delivery of Round 4 projects. There are
continuing doubts about whether all of the projects will
achieve grid connection and there is uncertainty over
the effects of a rule-change which no longer requires
debts to be underwritten by banks in advance of bid
acceptance [38] [45].
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4.3. Factors contributing to certainty in the South
African renewable energy programme
We can summarise how South Africa’s renewable
energy tender regime can be analysed in terms of our
previously mentioned five ‘certainty’ criteria. 
a) RE projects must have been granted planning
consent in order to be awarded contracts for
premium prices. However, there are few records
of controversies surrounding large scale RE
projects in South Africa. The degree to which
planning consent is guaranteed for the projects
or at least that the developers have secured
planning consent is a condition for being
awarded a contract.
b) In theory responsibility for provision of grid
connection rests with Eskom, although in
practice this responsibility has not been fully
carried in practice leading to some delays. 
c) Site selection and evaluation is a matter for the
developers. 
d) There is a policy of coordinating the programme
between the Department of Energy, Treasury,
the National Energy Regulator of South Africa
and Eskom. The financial closure of projects in
each bidding round is coordinated and
synchronised to promote implementation. 
e) The Department of Energy (DOE) has required
that there must be an agreement by bank(s) to
underwrite any debt as a condition for a bid to be
accepted. The DOE evaluates each bid for its
financial plausibility.
f) Developers must post significant guarantee
bonds prior to bidding for contracts and also
after signing contracts, as discussed later.
Sources: [32, 33]
4.4. The issue of technology costs under the auction
system 
So far there have been four rounds of bidding for the
renewable energy contracts, with awards being made for
contracts in  2011 (Round1), 2012 (Round 2), 2013
(Round 3) and then Round 4 in 2015. The final round
was delayed following problems with assuring grid
connection of projects given contracts in Round 3. Below
are graphs for the bid prices for onshore wind and solar
PV (which together secured over 90 per cent of the
contracted capacity) in different rounds of bidding.
These are shown in Figures 3 and 4 in Rand (ZAR) per
MWh in 2015 South African prices. The data is derived
from the Department of Energy (2015). These figures are
based on data released by the South African Government
which were based on 2014 prices, so inflation is added
onto them to generate figures for 2015. 
The proportion of contracts won by domestic (South
African) developers fell from 59 per cent in the first
round to 22 per cent in the third round (own research).
The ratio of unsuccessful to successful bids has also
consistently risen through the bidding rounds. Davin
Chown commented that ‘the lack of projects going to SA
based developers has led to deep concerns’. Chown also
commented that a lot of developers would prefer a feed-
in tariff system that could achieve a higher volume of
renewable energy deployment and form the basis for a
long term sustainable energy sector where Governments
developmental policy objectives are also met, [29].
As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, both wind power
and solar prices have fallen. Indeed, the Round 3 and
Round 4 prices are at least competitive, arguably rather
lower than, the cost of power from new coal fired power
plant in South Africa. The Department of Energy gave a
(2014) price of wind power of 619 ZAR which equates
to 676 ZAR in 2015. This converts to around $56 per
MWh in US currency (June 2015 prices), certainly less
than fossil fuel power prices in the EU. For South
Africa,  the prices for wind power  are considerably
lower than 970 ZAR price said, according to NERSA, to
be the levellised cost of power from new coal fired
power plant being built by Eskom [30].
However, before accrediting this fall in prices (solely)
to competitive bidding in the renewable energy auctions,
it has to be borne in mind that wind power and solar PV
prices were falling in other countries. As can be seen in
Figure 2, wind power prices also fell in the USA after
2009.  Indeed, the wind power contracts in 2013 pay
wind operators less than the South Africa average bid
prices, even after the Production Tax credit (and
inflation since 2013) is added to the contract prices. As
can be seen in 2013, wind power contracts were being
awarded for no more than $20 per MWh, which equates
to around $45 per MWh (June 2015 prices) being paid to
the operators when the Production Tax Credit and
inflation since 2013 is taken into account. This is still
less that in the case of the average price for the South
African wind power contracts. 
In the case of solar PV it is not possible to maintain
a case that solar PV prices have fallen due to
renewable energy auctions themselves simply on the
basis that SA auction prices have fallen. This is
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because there has been a global decline  in solar PV
auctions during this period which runs in parallel with
declines in the South African auctions for solar PV.
Prices of solar panels declined by 65 per cent in the
5 years up to 2014  [31].  Certainly the South African
market is only a very small part of the solar PV
market, and most of the build-up in solar PV capacity
has come from countries such as China, the EU, the
USA and Japan who have (up until 2015) not usually
employed renewable energy auctions to promote solar
PV installation. Hence SA prices are likely to be
influenced by global trends rather than vice versa.
4.5. Discussion
In sum, then, it can be seen that while there has
undoubtedly been success (so far)  in implementing the
SA renewable programme with declining costs, it is not
evident that the cost reductions can be substantially
ascribed to the auction process itself. However, the
auction/tender system does control costs in that the
Government can control the number of projects that  can
develop projects  for a given set of bid prices. 
Past and continued progress in the renewable energy
programme is dependent on certainty being achieved for
projects to be able to secure grid connection that is
affordable to the developers. This has only been
achieved so far because of the coordination of the
programme. Hence this coordination led by the South
African Government is important, and it has succeeded
so far in overcoming some serious financial problems
being faced by Eskom. However, there is uncertainty
about delivery of new projects. So it is clear that
continued regulatory leadership and certainty is a vital
part of delivery of the SA renewable programme. 
5. Overall discussion of two cases
In the introduction key objectives were set out to analyse
the performance of two auction/tenders systems, first  in
order to ascertain the degree and type of regulatory
certainty that generated effective delivery of renewable
energy, and second to examine the extent to which
auction systems can be said to reduce the costs of
renewable energy.  In practice we can see in both cases
(SA and Denmark) that a high degree of regulatory
certainty is important. First, it is important to guarantee
that schemes awarded contracts are able to achieve grid
connection that is affordable within the terms of their
original tenders. In Denmark this is achieved simply
through the agency of the state taking on the costs of the
grid connection and provision of transformer. In the case
of South Africa it is achieved through a guarantee that
the utility Eskom would cover grid connection costs.
However, in practice this has become merely an
objective of achieving affordable grid connection for the
developers. There have been initial problems with
implementing this for the third round projects. Such
problems have been overcome following intervention by
the SA Government. However, question marks remain
over how well grid connection will be achieved for the
projects given contracts in the fourth and successive
rounds of the South African RE programme.
It needs to be noted that grid connection should be
considered as an integral part of the auction/tender
process, and not be looked upon as a separate issue.
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Figure 3: Average bid prices for successful wind power  tenders
under REIPPP. Source; DOE 2015 [23]
All prices converted to 2015 South African prices using [52]
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Figure 4: Average bid prices for successful solar PV tenders under
REIPPP Source: DOE 2015 [23]
All prices converted to 2015 South African prices using [52]
The point is that the auction system restricts the
number of schemes that can be deployed to those that
are awarded the contracts. If there was a ‘feed-in
tariff’ system then developers might find sites where
grid connection was cheaper, and these projects would
then be deployed instead of projects that win bids but
which cannot be set up because grid connection costs
turn out to render them uneconomic. 
RE auction schemes can only deliver a given quantity
of renewable energy at a given price if schemes awarded
contracts under the bidding system can achieve
affordable grid connection. Much the same can be said
about planning consent in that RE auction systems can
only work efficiently if the projects can gain planning
consent within any timeframe demanded. In the cases
studied of Danish offshore wind and South African RE
this is not a problem, although this has been a problem
in the past in the case of the UK in the 1990s [38]. 
Second, there needs to be an effective coordinating
mechanism. In the case of Denmark this was done
through the aegis of the Danish Energy Agency (DEA). In
the case of South Africa, a coordinating group headed by
the Department of Energy office dealing with the REIPPP
occupies this role. The DEA’s role is simpler since it has
to deal with a smaller number of companies and projects.
Third, a key issue of certainty is that of providing
certainty that the developers will carry out their projects
if they are awarded contracts. This is being achieved in
most cases in South Africa, and the risk of losing their
money will certainly motivate developers to press for
Eskom to deliver on its commitments to assure
affordable grid connection.  In the case of Denmark a
‘bid bond’ system was introduced after developers pulled
out of the original contract for the Rodsand 2 Project. 
The issue of the impact on reducing costs of
renewable energy auction systems needs to be looked at
more carefully than simply reading off recent declines in
auction prices. In the case of the South African
renewable energy programme, costs have been declining
and  appear to be competitive with, indeed arguably
cheaper than, a conventional (coal) alternative.
However, in the case of the Danish programme offshore
wind prices have only declined since 2010. In South
Africa, of course, the RE auction programme has only
been operating since 2011. But wind power costs have
been declining since 2010, and solar PV costs have been
declining for decades. Given the earlier discussion there
is no evidence (from these cases) that the auction
schemes have reduced renewable energy costs any faster
than global technological trends for renewable energy.
In the case of wind power these seemed to rise in the
2005–2009 period.
Two further points need to be made here. First, auctions
or tenders  are useful in those cases where governments
want to plan the amount of capacity that is implemented,
and if a key risk is that too great a volume of projects may
be implemented at too great a cost. However, critics may
argue that auctions therefore err on the side of keeping
programme costs down rather than delivering large
volumes of renewable energy. It can be argued that auction
or tender programmes can reduce costs principally by
rationing the number of projects. If the emphasis on
developing volume is preferred, then it may be that feed-
in tariffs could be an effective policy choice.
The second point is that there is no evidence in the two
cases studied here that the auction or tender systems have
an inherent ability to reduce costs below what is dictated
by technological trends. Certainly it is possible to read
too much into the declining costs recorded in recent
auctions such as in South Africa and Denmark. These are
welcome signs for renewable energy of technological
cost reductions, but they are not generated by the
auction/tender systems per se. These cost trajectories
seem to be influenced by changes in technological cost
pressures, and recent declines in auction costs are
reflections primarily of that. Indeed, in the Danish case
the process set under the feed-in tariff are still lower than
the prices being given to more recent projects. Likewise,
in the case of South Africa, cost reductions have
paralleled the trend of cost reductions globally. 
It should also be added that the tender/auction
systems studied here are dominated by large
transnational corporations. It may be that this is
inevitable in the case of offshore wind projects,
although in Denmark there are efforts to sell
shareholdings to local people. It is clear from the
South African case that large companies have an
advantage in having access to cheaper sources of
finance compared to locally based developers. 
6. Conclusion
This paper posed two aims. One concerned the degree of
regulatory certainty necessary for an effective
auctions/tender programme. The other concerned the
ability of auction/tender systems to reduce the costs of
renewable energy. Two different cases, Danish offshore
windfarms and South African renewable energy, were
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examined to see whether even in such apparently
different cases whether common themes emerged.  One
thing that both cases have in common is that the
auction/tender regimes used in these countries appear to
be at least relatively successful in delivering renewable
energy.  Another common factor is that well organised
coordination of the programmes is important to
guarantee, as far as possible, that the projects who win
contracts can achieve grid connection. Also in both
cases planning consent is not difficult to obtain, and
also, in both cases, there has been serious attempts to
evaluate the financial plausibility of the bids that have
been made. The existence of penalties on companies
winning contracts for non-delivery of projects also
appears also to be important. These factors are crucial
contributions  to the concept of assuring ‘certainty’. 
On the issue of costs, it seems clear that the main
cause of recent cost reductions has little, if anything,  to
do with the auctions/tender systems themselves, and
mostly, if not entirely, to do with declining
technological costs of renewable energy in recent years.
It is certainly wrong to assume that recent reductions in
costs associated with renewable energy auction systems
are caused by the auction systems themselves. Rather,
the cost reductions coincide with a period of declining
costs for renewable energy. This implies that a
conventional feed-in tariff system may, in principle at
least, be no more expensive for a given level of
renewable energy deployment than an auction system. 
Certainly the auction systems can help countries plan
their renewable energy programmes, and control costs,
but this may only be an optimum policy if the intention
is to limit renewable energy deployment below a given
threshold rather than expand it towards a greater
potential. However, it is also the case that the
programmes need to be well regulated so as to achieve
certainty on issues including grid connection.
Nevertheless, sceptics of auction systems (and
supporters of conventional feed-in tariff systems) may
still maintain that the system is more oriented towards
controlling costs rather than developing larger volumes
of capacity that may, for example, be relevant to rapid
adoption of systems for obtaining 100 per cent of energy
from renewable energy [43]. The evidence in this study
is that, certainly in the case of South Africa, the auction
system is constraining renewable energy development
well below that which would be feasible for little
additional cost if a conventional (non-auction) feed in
tariff system was deployed.
7. Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements to Lesley Masters, Jelte Harnmeijer
and Anna Harnmeijer for help in research on renewable
energy in South Africa
8. References
Web references accessed on August 20th 2015–12–10
[1] European Commission (2014) Guidelines on State aid for
environmental protection and energy 2014–2020 2014/C
200/01 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
CELEX:52014XC0628(01)
[2] European Commission (2013) European Commission
guidance for the design of renewables support schemes,
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/node/69, page 6.
[3] Verbruggen, A., Nucci, M-R., Fischedick, M.,  Haas,
R.,Hvelplund, F.,Lauber, V.,, Lorenzoni, A.,, Mez, M.,
Nilsson, L Gonzalez, P., Schleich J., Toke, D.,’Europe’s
electricity regime: restoration or thorough transition’,
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and
Management Vol. 05 2015,  57–68, page 63 http://dx.doi.org/
10.5278/ijsepm.2015.5.6 
[4]  De Vos, R., Klessman, C (2014) How to design a renewable
energy auction for a successful auction, Energy Post, 22/05,
http://www.energypost.eu/design-successful-auction-
renewable-energy-projects/
[5]  Anaya, K., Pollitt, M., (2014) The Role of Distribution
Network Operators in Promoting Cost-Effective Distributed
Generation: Lessons from the United States for Europe, EPRG
Working Paper 1422, 
[6]  ibid [5] page 4
[7]  IRENA (2015) ‘Renewable Energy Auctions - A guide 
to design’, http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/
Publications/IRENA_RE_Auctions_Guide_2015_4_qualific
ation.pdf
[8]  Danish Wind Industry (2015) The Danish Market,
http://www.windpower.org/en/knowledge/statistics/the_danis
h_market.html
[9]  Denmark (2015) ‘The Official Website of Denmark’,
http://denmark.dk/en/green-living/wind-energy/
[10] Toke, D. (2011). ‘Ecological Modernisation, Social
Movements and Renewable Energy’.Environmental Politics,
vol 20, no. 1, pp. 60–77
[11] Denmark (2005) ‘Bidding results for 200 MW extension to
Horns Reef Wind Station’, Wind Power Monthly, August 1st,
http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/961949/bidding-
results-200-mw-extension-horns-reef-160-mw-wind-station
[12] Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen) (2015a) New
Offshore Wind Tenders in Denmark, Danish Energy Agency,
International journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 08 2015 53
David Toke
www.ens.dk/sites/.../new_offshore_wind_tenders_in_denmar
k_final.pdf
[13] Energistyrelsen (Danish Energy Agency) (2015) Aftale om
forpligtelsetil at etablereognettilslutte et elproduktionsanlæg,
Horns Rev 3, Energistyrelsen, www.ens.dk/sites/.../
koncessionsaftale_8_4.pdf, pages 4–5
[14]  ibid [14]  Pages 6–8
[15] Danish Energy Agency (2015b) ‘Nearshore Wind Tender’
http://www.ens.dk/en/supply/renewable-energy/wind-
power/offshore-wind-power/nearshore-wind-tenders
[16]  Wiser, R., Bolinger, M., (2014) Wind Technologies Market
Report, US Department of Energy, http://emp.lbl.gov/
sites/all/files/2013_Wind_Technologies_Market_Report_Fina
l3.pdf
[17]  (Unsigned 2005) Wind power Monthly, Bidding Results for
200 MW extension to Horns Reef, August 1st,
http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/961949/bidding-
results-200-mw-extension-horns-reef-160-mw-wind-station
[18] (Unsigned 2007) Wind power Monthly’ No longer an offshore
rush in Scandinavia - just three projects on the way for 500
MW’, March 1st, http://www.windpowermonthly.com
/article/954928/no-longer-offshore-rush-scandinavia—just-
three-projects-500-mw
[19] (Unsigned 2009) Wind power Monthly, Denmark still showing
its neighbours the way - offshore in Scandinavia, March 1st,
http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/ 961108/denmark-
showing-its-neighbours—offshore-scandinavia
[20]  Weston, D., (2015) Vattenfall wins Horns Rev 3, Wind power
Monthly, 27th February, http://www.windpoweroffshore.com
/article/1335997/vattenfall-wins-horns-rev-3
[21] Wiser, R., Bolinger, M., (2014) Wind Technologies Market
Report, US Department of Energy, http://emp.lbl.gov/
sites/all/files/2013_Wind_Technologies_Market_Report_Fina
l3.pdf
[22]  Department of Energy 2011a.Integrated Resource Plan for
Electricity 2010–2030, http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp%
20files/IRP2010_2030_Final_Report_20110325.pdf, pages
14–16
[23]  Department of Energy (2015) Renewable Energy IPP
Procurement Programme Bid Window 4, http://www.ippre
newables.co.za/#page/2183
[24] Pegels, A., 2010. RE in South Africa: Potentials, barriers and
options for support’, Energy Policy, Vol 38, 4945–4954
[25] Baker, L, Newell, P., Phillips, J., (2014) The Political
Economy of Energy, pages 9–10 Transitions: The Case of
South Africa, New Political Economy, forthcoming
[26] Interview with representative of the Energy Intensive Users
Group 21/06/2013 
[28] Interview with Davin Chown conducted by telephone on
17/04/2015. David Chown is Director of Genesis Eco-Energy,
also the Chairperson of the South Africa Photovoltaic Industry
Association; 
[29] ibid [28]
[30]  Pickworth, E., (2014) Investors put R82 billion into solar and
wind projects, Business Day, 2/06/2014 http://www.
mergence.co.za/media/11344/business%20day_investors%20
put%20r82bn%20into%20wind%20and%20solar%20renewa
ble%20energy%20plants_2%20june%2014.pdf
[31] Roston, E., (2015) By the Time You Read This, They’ve
Slapped a Solar Panel on Your Roof, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–02–25/in-the-time-it-
takes-to-read-this-story-another-solar-project-will-go-up
[32] Department of Energy (DOE) (2011) REQUEST FOR
QUALIFICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR NEW
GENERATIONCAPACITY UNDER THE IPP
PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME
PART A: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, RULES AND
PROVISIONS, Pretoria: DOE
[33]  Eberhard, A., Kolker, J., Leigland, J., (2014) South Africa’s
renewable IPPP - Success factors and lessons, PPFIA Report
- World Bank Group, 9–13
[34] ibid, 24–28
[35]  Creamer, T., (2014) ‘Fourth renewables bid announcement
postponed, amid third-round closure delay’ Polity, November
24, http://m.polity.org.za/article/fourth-renewables-bid-
announcement-postponed-amid-third-round-closure-delay-
2014–11–24
[36] Dodd, J., (2014) ‘Grid Problems Cause South Africa Delay’
Wind Power Monthly, October 17th
[37] Whiteacre. J., (2015) South Africa DoE confirms renewables
R4 and new allocation, https://ijglobal.com/articles/
95970/south-africa-doe-confirms-renewables-r4-and-new-
allocation
[38] Interview with Davin Chown, renewable energy company
executive 17/04/2015 (for details see reference [28]) .
[39]  Mitchell, C. and P. Connor. (2004)  Renewable energy policy
in the UK 1990–2003, Energy Policy 32, 17, 1935–1947
[40] Mittral, S., (2015) Sustain/innovate, Enel Green Power
Expands Footprint In South Africa With 425 MW Wind
Energy Bid, 22/04/2015, http://now.motherearthnews.com/
story/featured/enel-green-power-expands-footprint-in-
so/5976496747664276654e2b794441333143634c7734773d3d
[41] Index Mundi (2015), ‘Electricity Consumption - South
Africa’, http://www.indexmundi.com/south_africa/ electricity
_consumption.html;REEEP (2014) South Africa 2014,
http://www.reegle.info/policy-and-regulatory-overviews/ZA 
[42] WWF (2015) A review of the local community development
requirements in South Africa’s renewable energy procurement
programme, http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/local_
community_development_report_20150618.pdf, page 17
54 International journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 08 2015
Renewable Energy Auctions and Tenders: How good are they?
[43] De Jager, D., Rathmann, M., (2008) Policy instrument design
to reduce financing costs in renewable energy technology
projects. Ecofys, Utrecht, 
[44] Connolly, D, Vad Mathiesen, B. (2014) A technical and
economic analysis of one potential pathway to a 100%
renewable energy system, International journal of Sustainable
Energy Planning and Management Vol. 01 2014 7–28;  http://
dx.doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.2014.1.2 
[45] Personal communication from Anton Eberhard, Professor at
Graduate School of Business, University of Capetown,
21/04/2015
[46] Eberhard, A. (2013) ‘Feed-in tariffs or auctions? Procuring
renewable energy supply in South Africa’, The World Bank
Group, Viewpoint, Note Number 338, April 2013, 
[47] Lewis, J.I., Wiser, R.H., (2007) Fostering a renewable energy
technology industry: an international comparison of wind
industry policy support mechanisms. Energy Policy 35 (3),
1844–1857, 
[48] Mitchell, C., Bauknecht, D. and Connor, P. (2004), ‘
Effectiveness through Risk Reduction: A Comparison of the
Renewable Obligation in England and Wales and the Feed-In
System in Germany’, Energy Policy, 34 (3), 297–305, 
[49] del Rio P, Linares P. (2014) Back to the future? Rethinking
auctions for renewable electricity support Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Review 35: 42–56, 
[50] Kitzing, L., Weber, C., (2015) Support mechanisms for
renewables: How risk exposure influences investment incentives,
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and
Management Vol. 07 2015 117–134, http:// dx.doi.org/10.5278/
ijsepm.2015.7.9 
[51] Dodd, J., (2013) Analysis - wind power prices fall to new low in
SA tender, Wind Power Monthly, 7th November,
http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1219407/analysis—
wind-prices-fall-new-low-sa-tender
[52] Inflation Calculator, http://fxtop.com/en/inflation-calculator .php
[53] Wann, A, Connolly, D., Gallachoir, B., (2014) Investigating
100% renewable energy supply at regional level using scenario
analysis International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning
and Management Vol. 03 2014 21–32 http:// dx.doi.org/10.5278
/ijsepm.2014.3.3
International journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 08 2015 55
David Toke

